

# Sport diplomacy during the apartheid era in South Africa with the Olympic Movement in the centre of web: Three sport political approaches of the IOC Presidents Brundage, Lord Killanin and Samaranch towards the apartheid politics in South Africa

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## Abstract

This research was conducted as part of a master's degree thesis at the German Sport University in Cologne aiming to uncover sport diplomacy during the era of apartheid in South Africa with the Olympic Movement in the centre of web. A historical research was carried out to analyse various relations and their influence on the decision makers of the Olympic Movement from the early 1960s until the reintegration to the Olympic Summer Games 1992 in Barcelona. Focusing on the three International Olympic Committee (IOC) Presidents Brundage, Lord Killanin and Samaranch, one can clearly examine different approaches towards sport politics. While Brundage was rather successful in separating sport and politics, Lord Killanin did not have choice to cope with the emerging influence of international actors. Samaranch clearly used the political framework of the United Nations (UN) for his means and implemented the IOC Commission Apartheid and Olympism, which was the first step of a sporting reintegration of South Africa.

## Keywords

Olympism, Apartheid, South Africa, Sport Politics, Sport Diplomacy, IOC Presidents.

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## **Introduction and Purpose**

In modern times the Olympic Movement has become the institution for sport around the world by organizing the Summer and Winter Olympic and Paralympic Games every four years. For this reason, sport and especially mega-sport events have been the playground for various political power games and diplomatic actions. So, did for example the National Socialists in 1936 instrumentalize the Olympic Games to show strength after World War I or a Palestinian group hijacked Israeli athletes during the 1972 Olympic Games to make aware of a crisis in the Middle East (Johns, 2014). Sport has been of growing interest especially after World War II, respectively during the Cold War, when international relations as a consequence of the decolonialization process became more complex. The accelerating political, cultural, social, economic and diplomatic significance of sport led into the two big boycotts during the cold war in 1980 and 1984 between the western and the eastern affiliated states (Murray, 2018). Within these times another long and profound conflict was on the international agenda - the issue of legal racial segregation in the Republic of South Africa: Apartheid. After 1945 and the end of World War II, a white minority claimed power in Southern Africa and suppressed the Black and Indian community (Krumpholz, 1991; Schlosshan, 1992). This caught the attention of various stakeholders, who wanted to pressure the South African government stopping racial segregation (Booth, 2003). According to the Olympic Charter, the IOC prohibited South African athletes to participate at the Olympic Games between 1964 and 1992. The whole issue on South Africa caused a lot of tension within the sporting environment and especially the Olympic Movement. A historical approach aims to help understand people, societies, behaviours and developments. Learning from the past is essential to understand the present and create the future (Stearns, 1998). Stakeholders, their relations and methods can be examined by bringing letters from the Olympic Archive of that time into a chronological order and linking them in order to illustrate a holistic picture of the time.

## **Diplomacy within the Olympic Movement**

In addition to the historical approach, the ideas of *Olympism as Diplomacy* and *Olympic Diplomacy* serve as a sport political framework. *Olympic Diplomacy* understands the Olympic Movement as the central object of investigation and can be classified as Multi-Stakeholder Diplomacy. It incorporates commercial, governmental and civil society organisations at all levels. It describes the lobby work of various actors with a shared interest engaging and keeping the diplomatic process in mind. This is mainly associated with activities around Olympic Games, especially when aiming for or securing a successful bid for the Games (Beacom, 2012). *Olympism as Diplomacy* in contrast clearly states that the Olympic Games can be considered as a diplomatic occasion itself, nonetheless it points out that the IOC promotes various soft power tools continuously (Beacom, 2012). Diplomacy through the Olympics, are, according to Beacom, diplomatic actions of states and agents during the Games to pursue specific organisational goals. The sport event then has become the playground of diplomacy but with the IOC in the centre of web, the Olympic Movement can act as mediating force between collectives and claim it as *Diplomacy of the Olympics* (Beacom, 2012; Der Derian, 1987). *Diplomacy of the Olympics* is carried out continuously by various agents beside the IOC, which include International Federations (IF) as well as the regional, national and continental Olympic Committees. Wide-spread known activities of Coubertin's idea of Olympism are Olympic Solidarity and Olympic education programmes both aiming a mutual understanding for others and peace building (Beacom, 2012; Müller, 2000).

## **Sport diplomacy during the apartheid era**

When analysing the diplomacy in the sporting environment during the apartheid era, one can note that especially rugby and cricket have been from researchers' interest. Already during the apartheid analysed Lapchick South Africa's Use of Sport in its Foreign Policy (Lapchick, 1977). He points out the importance of sport in South Africa's foreign relations at the time and gives an overview of the happenings until the publication of his paper in 1977. Since it has been still an ongoing debate, the sources refer primarily to newspaper articles of the time and official

publications. Kidd follows the same approach and expanded the literature until 1988. Remarkably, when describing the Campaign against Sport in South Africa, the importance of the IOC, the Commonwealth Games Federation (CGF) as well as of the UN are already acknowledged (Kidd, 1988). In another study describes Kidd (1991) the last two years of the campaign against apartheid and examined recent developments in South African sport, its organisations and policies just before the reintegration into the Olympic Movement. Weisbord illustrates handlings of the Olympic Movement in the centre of pro- and anti-apartheid initiatives but assumes that the critical dispute ends with the expulsion of South Africa from the Olympic Movement in 1970 (Weisbord, 2015). The fact that Olympic Games can serve as a playground for the causa South Africa even though they are not competing is explained by Downes. It is elaborated when analysing sport as a diplomatic tool by African and Caribbean countries to support their arguments within the Commonwealth (Downes, 2014). Cornelissen links the diverse external powers to the IOC when uncovering the cooperating network of African, “Third World Countries” and “Second World (Communist) Countries”(Cornelissen, 2012). She points out collective actions of various initiatives within the Olympic movement during the Cold War and indicates the social protest, ideologies and race which led to the transnational campaign against the readoption of South Africa in the Olympic Movement from a sociological point of view. Given this orientation, Nauright takes the social structures and cultures into consideration to assess the impact of sporting sanctions on the South African society and states that especially the white South African population suffered from the sporting exclusion. However, the question remains unsolved whether sporting exclusion solely would have been enough to end apartheid (Nauright, 2010). While claiming that the influence of sport diplomacy can be hardly measured, Keech and Houlihan elaborated indicators to investigate the influence of the sporting opposition in different international organizations. Even though they concluded that sport had a symbolic function and was able to influence other policy actors, sport had been far less significant to end apartheid than assumed (Keech & Houlihan, 1999).

A holistic historical approach of the Olympic Movement, the IOC and its Presidents Brundage, Lord Killanin and Samaranch is lacking in the field of Olympic Studies. Subsequently minutes of IOC Executive Board meetings, IOC Sessions and personal

letters from the IOC Archives at the Olympic Studies Centre Lausanne are combined to uncover the sports diplomatic actions within the Olympic Movement during the constitutionalized era of apartheid.

## **Avery Brundage, IOC President between 1952 and 1972**

The American Avery Brundage was the first IOC President facing the racism and apartheid issue during his presidency. Already in January 1959 first proof can be found that the topic of racism and sport was discussed in newspapers (Ranji, 1959a, 1959b). However, a South African delegation of athletes was allowed to participate at the Olympic Games in Rome 1960. With a western dominated IOC the South African National Olympic Committee (SANOC), was once again able to persuade the delegates to postpone an exclusion at the IOC Session in Moscow (International Olympic Committee, 1962). At that time especially the IOC Sessions were the place for lobbying pro and contra SANOC. Just when Ahmed Ebrahim a delegate of the South African Non-Racial Olympic [later Open] Committee (SANROC) stated in a press conference that 52 Afro-Asian countries decided on a possible boycott of the Olympic Games, when South Africa was allowed to participate at the upcoming Olympic Games 1964, first considerations to exclude South African athletes were taken into account (International Olympic Committee, 1964). Even though Brundage took a role as a mediator during the IOC Session, afterwards he stated in a letter from February 2, 1964 that South Africa still had the chance to qualify for the Games in Tokyo (International Olympic Committee, 1964). SANOC however was not able to fulfil the demands of the IOC to change the sporting system and was subsequently not allowed to participate at the Olympic Games in Rome. SANOC accused the IOC and Brundage that it was not possible for them to differentiate between sport and politics which was rejected explicitly also writing in the letter that it was hard to satisfy all actors (International Olympic Committee, 1964). After demands to expel SANOC from the IOC and the role of the South African IOC member Reginald Honey was questioned in IOC Executive Board meetings, Brundage seemed concerned: "If we expel them, we shall never see them again. If we suspend them immediately, this could cause the arrangement that they are desperately trying to make with their government to miscarry" (International Olympic

Committee, 1966, p. 14). The IOC postponed the decision several times until a Special Commission had been sent to South Africa in 1967 under the lead of Lord Killanin. Simultaneously, Brundage circulated a letter to the IFs asking for their views on South Africa as they are an important pillar of the Olympic Movement. While the Federation Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) had suspended the respective soccer federation already in 1962, the International Amateur Athletic Federation (IAAF) decided in 1964 to keep South Africa in the sporting body (Burghley, 1967; Killanin, Rous, & Käser, 1967). Incorporating all opinions was essential for Brundage. He left the decision open to the democratic structures of the IOC which voted for an attendance of South African athletes at the Olympic Games 1968 in Mexico City (International Olympic Committee, 1968b). The decision caused immense tension: The British and the Australian NOC supported the admission of South Africa since the countries have had a long tradition within the Commonwealth (De Broglio, 1968). Vis-à-vis were the newly independent states from the Caribbean solidarizing with the African countries against the former colonizers threatening with a boycott (Downes, 2014). The structures of the IOC were following heavily questioned since “This decision was a MINORITY decision. The 37 members who voted in favour of the admission of South Africa represented no more than 23 countries. The 28 votes against came from at least 25 countries. [The voting system being loaded in favour of the western countries]” (De Broglio, 1968). Having still an imperial ideology the British IOC member Marquess of Exeter replied to this topic that, “in the field of sport, they [the different countries] do not all have the same importance” (International Olympic Committee, 1968a, p. 3). Brundage saw the necessity for the Games to integrate most countries, which had already withdrawn the invitation, because otherwise IFs might stage simultaneously their own World Championships what would undercut the Olympic idea (International Olympic Committee, 1968a). Brundage could satisfy the demands of the boycott threatening countries and protected the Olympic Games, however during the Olympic Games the African NOCs held a meeting before the 68th IOC Session to declare that an expulsion of the SANOC from the IOC as well as from all IFs would be necessary at that point in time (International Olympic Committee, 1968d, 1968c). While the decision was postponed and the UN General Assembly asked all states to end sporting relations with South Africa, SANOC was convinced to showcase sporting strength through the South

African Games in 1969 (International Olympic Committee, 1968d, 1969; Krumpholz, 1991). With the empowerment of the Supreme Council for Sport in Africa (SCSA) pressure on the IOC and IOC President Brundage increased, since he was addressed by both the anti-apartheid lobby and the old ties. SANOC had been in a powerful position at that time, demanding proof for Olympic Charter violations, however at the 70th IOC Session in Amsterdam 1970 35 to 28 votes agreed to withdraw the recognition of SANOC (International Olympic Committee, 1970). This landmark decision impeded the South African ambition to participate at the Olympic Games in Munich 1972, nonetheless SANOC could lobby for a reintegration at the 72nd IOC Session in Sapporo 1972 (International Olympic Committee, 1972). Brundage pursued a hands-off approach, since he had a slightly different opinion on the South African topic: “all countries were guilty of discrimination on religious grounds, e.g. clubs for Catholics, Jews etc.” (International Olympic Committee, 1972, p. 42). In advance of the Olympic Games in Munich 1972 Brundage remained rather inactive at the end of his presidency. Without changing the status quo South African athletes were not invited to the Games also, because the SCSA and SANROC had increased their sport political influence. Remarkably, the influence on the IOC during Brundage’s presidency was after all mostly by sport administrators in powerful positions not politicians.

### **Lord Killanin, IOC President between 1972 and 1980**

The Irishman Lord Killanin was increasingly affected by the tensions between South African supporters and the anti-apartheid movement. For instance, two IOC members travelled against Lord Killanin’s recommendations to the new edition of the South African Games in 1973, which gave the news coverage in South Africa to believe that SANOC had again a chance to participate internationally. Furthermore, some NOCs supported the regional games, which led to controversy within the Olympic Movement. At least in his sphere of influence, Lord Killanin tried to intervene concerning the attendance of the Irish team, which was unsuccessful (Kennedy, 1973). One problem for the IOC President was the structure within the Olympic Movement. Although he was willing to isolate the South African sport, he did not have the competencies for sports outside the Olympic structures like cricket

and rugby. Since in those sports it was possible for South Africa to show sporting strength, the playground had shifted in 1974 from the Olympic Movement to the CGF. The inaction of the IOC and Lord Killanin relapsed in 1976 right before the Olympic Games in Montreal, where the non-Olympic sport rugby caused a boycott initiated by SCSA. Although the IOC was warned by the SCSA that African and Caribbean countries would stay away from the Games, it was concerned with other political tensions within the Olympic Movement like the Taiwan and China issue (Fifth Conference of non-aligned countries in Colombo, 1976; International Olympic Committee, 1976b, 1976c). It seems like that Lord Killanin and other sport administrators underestimated the demand to expel New Zealand's athletes because of the UN's Third Party Principle, which allowed to exclude sporting parties with relations to South Africa (United Nations (UN), 1975). Due to the absence of the African countries Lord Killanin offered private discussions to sporting leaders and asked whether sanctions to the African teams were executed by the IF (International Olympic Committee, 1976a; Lord Killanin, 1976). He made an effort to prevent such a spontaneous boycott at future competitions and saw the Commonwealth countries signing the Gleneagles Agreement to discourage contacts and competitions between athletes, sporting bodies, teams as well as individuals with South Africa (Downes, 2014). In reaction to that the IOC made its first convergency with UN bodies to incorporate political players (International Olympic Committee, 1978; Lord Killanin, 1978). This however caused tension within the Olympic Movement since intervention into the sport governance was feared (International Olympic Committee, 1979c). IOC President Lord Killanin functioned both as multiplier and mediator but also as a leader, hence he tried to guide the Olympic Movement top-down through the ambiguous topic. NOCs and IFs had different approaches and attitudes to handling South African athletes. While soccer had cut its ties with South Africa, the International Hockey Federation (IHF) cancelled its congress in the USSR because South Africans were not allowed to enter the country, the International Archery Federation (FITA) voted against the expulsion of the South African Archery Federation and the International Tennis Federation (ITF) still allowed South African individual athletes to compete internationally (International Tennis Federation, 1979; International Olympic Committee, 1979b; IOC Secretariat, 1979). Lord Killanin tried to mediate and left decisions to the democratic



structures of the IFs without intervening too much but publicly announcing displeasure of sport competitions with South Africans (Brutus, 1979). Using the Olympic structures, Lord Killanin, in cooperation with the French Olympic Committee, was able to stop a French rugby team competing against South Africa, because the French rugby federation was a member of the French Olympic Committee (International Olympic Committee, 1979a). Within the Olympic chain of command he could influence directly sport politics concerning a sporting South African isolation, which was appreciated by African sport leaders (Brutus, 1979). A conflicting viewpoint was the Western countries' NOCs which still maintained connections with South Africa. Subsequently it was a fight for the interpretive means of the western and eastern affiliated states with the IOC in the centre of web. Some believed that "Soviet propaganda, however, has affected world opinion and given a false idea of apartheid" (Haffner, 1980). The east-west conflict spilled over and overshadowed all other political conflicts at the Olympic Games 1980 in Moscow where a boycott of western countries due to a Soviet invasion in Afghanistan took place. Powerless in this regard, Lord Killanin stepped down as IOC President after the Olympic Games, where Juan Antonio Samaranch was elected as the successor.

### **Juan Antonio Samaranch, IOC President between 1980 and 2001**

The former ambassador Samaranch had to take over the IOC in a critical phase. Sport had become a playground for politics, the amateur rule was questioned and increasing commercial actions stressed the philosophy of the Olympic Movement. Bearing threats for the next Olympic Games 1984 in Los Angeles in mind, Samaranch became merely proactive to preserve the Games. In the South African matter, he corresponded with both SANOC and the anti-apartheid movements and pressured the German host Daume at the Olympic Congress in Baden-Baden 1981 to forbid a South African hospitality centre, which had taken place during earlier IOC events (Juan Antonio Samaranch, 1981). During the Olympic Congress Samaranch negotiated a deal with SANOC, which wanted to apply formally to the IOC again. He was able to prevent this by promising another factfinding tour to South Africa in the future (International Olympic Committee, 1983). Samaranch's diplomatic approach can also be analysed in his

actions to deepen the relations with the UN to protect the Olympic Movement and especially the Olympic Games from a misuse of political leaders. Moreover, he used both the IFs and NOCs for his purpose by serving their interests (Burger, 1982; International Olympic Committee, 1982). Samaranch was keen to protect the Olympic Games through a UN body especially in advance of the Olympic Games 1984 in Los Angeles. Although the South African issue was a minor one in the discussion, relations especially with the UN Special Committee against Apartheid remained vibrant (Juan Antonio Samaranch, 1983). Since the attention diverted to the boycott of eastern countries during the Olympic Games 1984 in Los Angeles, some South African athletes were able to compete under the flag of other NOCs (Staff Reporter, 1984). The Olympic Games 1984 pressured the Olympic Movement heavily. To overcome recent challenges and to find a strategy for the future an IOC Session on the future of the Olympic Games was set up. Samaranch acknowledged various bodies' ideas like the Association of National Olympic Committees (ANOC). ANOC had published the Mexico Declaration in November 1984 urging all IFs to exclude South Africa's membership immediately (International Olympic Committee, 1984). Nonetheless it was difficult for the IOC satisfying all opinions, as especially Great Britain and New Zealand still had a different point of view and also the USOC President neglected discrimination in South Africa ('84 Mobilization for Peace and Justice, 1984; International Olympic Committee, 1984). Subsequently it was not decided on concrete actions of the IOC at that point in time. Samaranch and the IOC rather formulated vague statements to remain the contact person and to interpret the Olympic Charter exclusively, although a cooperation with the UN was merely aspired. The last point became especially important since the IOC wanted to be perceived as an international governmental player within the UN framework but relying on the autonomy of sport. In May 1985 the UN Special Committee against Apartheid, the SCSA and SANROC organized the International Conference on Sports Boycott against South Africa (International Conference on the Sports Boycott against South Africa, 1985). This was the starting point for an even closer collaboration between various stakeholders with the IOC as lynchpin for South African apartheid and sport. Being approached from different angles Samaranch manoeuvred the Olympic Movement through uncertain times with boycott threats of African-Caribbean countries as well as lobbyism from inside and outside the IOC, like SANOC, the SCSA,

SANROC, activist groups or the Kenyan IOC member Reginald S. Alexander (Smith, 2006). To find a sustainable solution and to protect the Olympic Games 1988 in Seoul from political boycotts by African NOCs, Samaranch both invited sporting leaders to the first Apartheid and Olympism meeting in April 1988 and underlined that the apartheid problem should be solved by the African continent without greater intervention by other countries (International Olympic Committee, 1988). While the South African sport diplomacy still tried to circumvent the cultural and sporting boycott, the IOC officially positioned a representative of SANROC in an IOC commission: Sam Ramsamy was recognized as an official advisor for the newly founded IOC Apartheid and Olympism Commission (Samaranch, 1988). The IOC and especially the IOC Apartheid and Olympism Commission can be clearly perceived as the initiator for the reunification process of the different sporting federations within South Africa. Therefore the IOC President was acknowledged as a supporter of Africa by African sport leaders (Lawal, 1988). Although not all demands for equal sporting opportunities were given in South Africa, he was stressing a rapid reintegration of a South African Olympic Team for the Olympic Games 1992 in Barcelona (Samaranch, 1991). Samaranch was aware of the political symbolism, integrating the National Olympic Committee of South Africa (NOCSA) into the Olympic Movement. Furthermore, he was seeking for contact with Nelson Mandela to underline the power of sport in the transformation process of the South African nation (Samaranch, 1990). Samaranch positioned himself and the IOC as a political player, who could have an impact on societies through sport. The political approach is not the only matter, which differs him to the other IOC Presidents during the apartheid era.

### **Comparing differences and similarities**

IOC President Avery Brundage was the first, who had to deal with the shift of power relations away from a western dominated IOC. The apartheid topic displays very well the struggles he was facing, when new players argued for the expulsion of SANOC firstly from the Olympic Games and then from the IOC. Remarkably, it was the first voting session before the Olympic Games in Mexico 1968, where the power relations due to the voting system originally were in favour for SANOC not to exclude it. Brundage's overall goal was to safeguard the Olympic Games, since the Olympic Movement

did not have the strength to compensate the loss of various African and Caribbean athletes during the Olympic Games in Mexico. Functioning as a mediator he believed in the democratic structures of the IOC, but in some statements one can see that his opinion was slightly different to the IOC's opinion he had to represent. Other IOC members stated their old colonial views more openly like the British IOC member Marquess of Exeter. With the rapid reconsolidation of the African continent and the decolonialisation already during his presidency he had to unite the old ties and the emerging powers. Although the apartheid issue had been already heavily politicised, he was aiming to differentiate between sport and politics. Even he made good efforts, it was not always possible, as hard politics with visa denials for South Africans forced Brundage for instance to relocate an IOC Session (International Olympic Committee, 1963). Brundage manoeuvred the IOC out of some challenging situations and was able to pour oil on troubled water even though his and the IOC's power was limited at this time. Compared to Lord Killanin, Brundage was more successful to keep the discussion on a sporting level. This might be as well, because global infrastructure was not that advanced as during Lord Killanin's presidency and intergovernmental institutions did not have the resources to focus on sport. While letters were the preferred way of correspondence, personal meetings for exchange were not as frequent as later and subsequently lobbying and diplomatic actions took way more time. Keeping the characterizations of an amateur and network type of diplomacy in mind, Brundage's presidency can be rather clustered to the traditional sport diplomacy with the IOC and its President in the centre. This changed already during the 1970s and Lord Killanin's presidency. Quicker response and more stakeholders with various interests made governing increasingly complex for him. This was also applicable for the topic of apartheid which caused more and more tension in the Olympic Movement. Since the anti-apartheid movement could organize globally and the SCSA increased their influence, the old power structures got obsolete. The SCSA for example had successfully threatened the German NOC in advance of the Olympic Games in Munich 1972. If a German team namely had joined the South African Games in 1969, African countries would have considered a boycott of the Olympic Games 1972. The protection of Olympic Games had been always the overall goal of sport administrators. The fact that Lord Killanin and the IOC did not see the SCSA putting the

boycott threat into action at the 1976 Olympic Games in Montreal is in this regard remarkable. Surely, the claim for the interpretive dominance from both the western and eastern countries and international conflicts such as the Taiwan-China issue spilled-over to the Olympic Movement and demanded resources. As it was before the Olympic Games 1976 low on the agenda and unity was lacking, not having a clear strategy how to handle apartheid challenged the entire Olympic Movement. Since the Olympic Games got bigger, it could have been a western arrogance not taking the boycott threats of the SCSA serious enough. The SCSA, using this anti-diplomacy as a measure of last resort, was since then accepted and perceived as influential agent in the matter of apartheid. It is interesting that non-Olympic sports like rugby and cricket led - not only in this case but in general - to a high potential of conflict within the Olympic Movement. One of the problems was the organisational structure of the IOC. Although it was perceived as the highest sporting authority, only IFs and NOCs could be given direction. Because rugby and cricket caused also later tension, maybe it would have been attractive to integrate these sports into the Olympic Movement. Especially as rugby had been an Olympic sport for several years until 1924 and was reintegrated in Olympic Games again in 2016 (BBC, 2009). Lord Killanin in his position as IOC President was not progressive in the matter of apartheid and rather administrated. The increasing influence of the different players was noted, but at first the convergence with the UN was very hesitant. In general, the IOC members were persuaded that they could still separate sport and politics and demanded this also from the IOC President. Furthermore, they feared intervention in the sporting autonomy, Lord Killanin was in this respect somehow representing this attitude personally. Especially during Lord Killanin's IOC Presidency the Commonwealth turned into an important player for sporting sanctions and declarations for instance with the Gleneagles Agreement. Since it was limited to Commonwealth Countries, it also undercut the sporting authority of the IOC as other players like the EU sport ministers and the UN Centre against Apartheid discovered sport as a tool to pressure the South African government as well. Samaranch was politically more advanced probably due to his ambassador career before. He understood how to incorporate the international players and to lobby for the means of the IOC. Especially since he placed several sport officials in international committees, the IOC could now

lobby for their interests and knew which agenda the others pursued. This information advantage explicitly differentiates Samaranch from the other IOC Presidents before. Nonetheless, it must be acknowledged that he was also the one mixing up sport and politics. The commitment in international organisations led to tension within the IOC but Samaranch explained transparently that everything he did was just to keep the IOC competitive. In the Olympic Studies Centres' archive especially during his presidency various circular letters can be found, which indicate that he wanted to integrate everyone's opinion or at least giving the impression that they were heard. As the situation within South Africa tightened up in the end of the 1980s and amendments were necessary, the step founding the IOC Apartheid and Olympism Commission to solve the apartheid problem was game-changing. Especially because the matter was now tackled actively by the IOC and the topic had a continuous point on the agenda of IOC Sessions and Executive Board meetings, just as the other IOC commissions. With the claims that the African continent should solve this problem self-contained, Samaranch both distributed the power to the African sports leaders and secured his own power within the IOC since there were a lot of votes to gain by the African NOCs. Being a friend of the African continent was both acknowledged by African sport leaders and can be also seen in the fact that Samaranch was the first IOC President visiting all African NOCs in person (International Olympic Committee, 1985). Generally, one can analyse that within the Olympic Movement the amount of people with imperialistic views decreased and representatives of the anti-apartheid movement were given more scope after Samaranch had taken over the IOC's lead. While Lord Killanin and the South African Mc Ildowie had used their first names in correspondences, Samaranch kept on distance with the South African sporting leaders until he wanted to open the door for South African sport. Samaranch wanted to be perceived as the one abolishing apartheid through sports by bringing the conflict parties together and providing the new and old South African organisations a leap of faith during the transition period. He was clearly striving for international recognition as a peace builder when promoting first the Olympic Games in Seoul 1988 and then the Olympic Games in Barcelona 1992, his native town, the first time with a racially mixed South African team again.

Summing up, the general competences of diplomacy communication, representation, information gathering, negotiation as well as dissemination and symbolism were

understood by all three presidents, when dealing with apartheid but differently distinct. While Brundage was rather successful in separating sport and politics, Lord Killanin did not have choice but to cope with the emerging influence of international actors and Samaranch clearly used it for his means. During all the presidencies the values of the Olympic Movement and the successful staging of Olympic Games remained the overall goal. Moreover, every IOC President functioned as mediator between the conflicting parties, but the amount of personal influence differed. Whilst Lord Killanin set the basis for an exchange between the IOC and the UN, Samaranch developed the IOC in terms of internationalisation and commercialisation. With the structural and ideological changes, he set the foundation for the IOC's success. Ranking above all others, the IOC functions now more than ever in the centre of a network with athletes, sponsoring companies, governments, IFs and NOCs.

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